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
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
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Bucci, Steven P. O-3
HQDA, MILPERCEN (DAPC-OPA-E)
200 Stovall street
Alexandria, Va. 22332

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-specific case of U.S.-Greek relations between 1967
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SUPPORT OR SANCTIONS
THE AMERICAN RESPONSE TO AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES


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
Steven Peter Bucci


Bachelor of Science

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Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
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CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. HISTORIC POLICY DILEMMA	
Juxtaposed Guide Posts	6
Varying Predominance	14
The Dilemma in the Greek Case.	31
III. CASE STUDY: U.S. - GREEK RELATIONS	
Background	33
Pre-Coup Policies and Involvement.	37
The Coup D'etat.	48
U. S. Reaction	50
IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION	
Options.	60
Critique	65
Recommendations.	74
END NOTES.	79
BIBLIOGRAPHY	85

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

Since 1945, the world has been a turbulent place. This turbulence is the context for those who make foreign policy decisions. In the forty year period since the conclusion of the Second World War, more than two-thirds of the countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East have experienced military intervention into their governing process.¹ On many occasions the governments, set up as a result of those interventions have been sympathetic to the West in general and the United States in particular. In any case, the President and the policy making establishment must decide on the proper stance to assume toward such regimes. The question that will be addressed in this study is:

What should United States policy reaction be when an ally's government is overthrown and replaced by an even more pro-American military regime...support or sanctions?

This question has relevance for the foreign policy analyst for several reasons. First, the United States has been faced with this problem many times in the past. The importance of a political phenomenon is partly determined by the frequency of its occurrence. A brief look at the frequency of military takeovers clearly illustrates the need for careful consideration of the problem. Among the twenty Latin American nations, only Costa Rica and Mexico have not had a military intervention. Close to half of all the men who have served as heads of state in these countries have been military officers. There have been successful coups in at least half of the eighteen Asian States. In the Middle East and Northern Africa there has been at least one coup attempt in over two thirds of the countries. They were successful in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, the Sudan, Libya and Liberia. In the first six years of independence, for most of the tropical African nations (1960-66), civilian governments set

up at their founding were overthrown in eight countries. By the end of the next decade over half of these countries had experienced coups and had military governments. One writer contended, "In any recent year they (the military) controlled the government in about one-third of these (developing) countries, while acting as praetorians² behind a facade of civilian control in another third."³

There is no indication that this trend will stop. The fragile political and social structures of most developing nations make them easy targets for "men on horseback". America, therefore, must be prepared to execute an appropriate policy, within a minimum amount of time, towards these states. Because sudden changes of government seldom can be predicted, the importance of thinking about options in advance is multiplied. We now live in a world where small developing nations sometimes possess assets or attributes that are of vital importance to a super power. These may include, natural resources (oil, chromium, etc.), geostrategic location, (guarding waterways, ports, airfields on strategic routes, leased facilities, communication sites, equipment storage points, etc.), or simply historic and political links, (ethnic connections, emotional empathy). In any case, while a change in the government of a small nation may not pose a direct threat or an enormous boost to a super power, it is a definite concern to policy makers.

The second consideration of relevance to the question, is less concrete, but probably even more important. This is the intertwining of the two great threads of American foreign policy in particular, and American political thought in i.e., the juxtaposition of idealism and

practicality. Clearly, any question that causes us to study this historical conflict is relevant. Through study, some direction as to which might be the proper path to take can be obtained. This is critical to all United States foreign policy, even when the distinction between the two aspects is not as obvious as in the present instance.

The opening section will identify potential limitations and areas that may be considered weak-points. The assumptions that assure the validity of the conclusions, despite the limitations, will be presented and justified as well. The study will first investigate the problem on the more general level of the historic policy dilemma. Beginning with a discussion of the two foundational documents of our republic, the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution, the roots of the conflicting viewpoints will be shown. The documents themselves, as well as the comments of the framers, illustrate the poles between which our policy makers have moved since 1790. The varying degrees of prominence that each side of the dilemma has held during the progression of our history will be traced. An investigation of the of major policies, addresses, or private correspondence of representatives of the different periods will be drawn upon. The chapter will conclude with a brief look at how the dilemma impacts on the specific case of the United States policy towards the Greek military Junta (1967-70).

The next chapter is the Greek case study itself. In it, the historic situation will be established; then a policy analysis will take place. It will open with a look at United States involvement, in the Greek situation, and our policies prior to the coup in 1967. This

section will also provide some background as to the internal political situation in Greece, and the coup itself will be discussed briefly. The main purpose here is to illustrate the character and methods of the men involved with the coup. The bulk of the chapter will be devoted to a thorough analysis of the actual American reaction to the Junta at the time of the coup and immediately thereafter. The decision making process that occurred and the rationale behind the final decisions will be investigated. Particular attention will be paid to the U.S. domestic input into the decision, specifically from the legislative branch and various lobbies. In addition to illustrating the decision making process, an important goal of this section is the identification of all the policy options considered by the decision makers.

The reasoning and analysis of the unused options, in combination with the actual policy, will provide the core of the next chapter of the study. This chapter will consist of a detailed analysis of all the options considered by the policy makers in the Greek case. Utilizing the conclusions drawn in the discussion of practicality versus idealism, the analysis will have three parts. First, a critique of the policy that was actually implemented will be conducted. Next, the actual policy will be analyzed along side each of the unused options, and their possible effect, both long and short term, will be discussed. Finally, a conclusion as to the success of the actual policy makers in selecting the best option will be drawn.

The final section of the study will be a recommendation for future action in similar situations. Key points for consideration and study by the decision maker will be noted, particularly those that might vary in

different cases. It is neither safe nor really plausible to try and find a specific "line" to follow through the complex countryside that is foreign policy. No one policy will "always" apply. However, within the confines of the Study, it is possible to provide a "broad road" within which the policy maker can find an appropriate response for a certain type of situation. That is the goal of this study.

There are certain limitations that must be recognized from the outset. The first, and most obvious one, is that the case study selected does not concern a third world country, but a "Western European" nation. I would contend that this is not really a problem. Due to the devastation of Second World War, the relative frequency of governmental shifts, as well as other demographic and cultural factors, Greece, in the early 1960's, closely approximated a developing nation relative to the industrial powers, particularly the U.S.. The total applicability of Nordlinger's Model for praetorian intervention is further evidence of the validity of this assumption.⁴ The other area that some might consider a potential weak point, is that because Greece was a member of NATO, possible U.S. responses were limited to a degree. However, while more extreme options may be "open" to policy makers, they are unlikely to use them. South Africa is an example that has current relevance. It is not a NATO signatory, but it does have vital strategic value to the United States. It is highly unlikely that our foreign policy apparatus will consider any options that are radically different from those considered in the case of the Greek Junta. Even in the event that they are considered, the political climate insures that they are destined to be only "strawmen".

CHAPTER II

HISTORIC POLICY DILEMMA

JUXTAPOSED GUIDE POSTS

Throughout our history, we have been in a dilemma deciding what the guiding principle of our foreign policy should be. The conflict arises between idealism and realism.⁵ These terms will be used interchangeably with Morgenthau's throughout this study. The controversy arises by comparing the two foundation documents of our nation, the Declaration of Independence, and the U.S. Constitution. The idealism of the Declaration of Independence is clear. Its assertion of universal moral precepts to justify the break from England puts it on the high plane of principle. The Constitution and The Federalist Papers, written to support its ratification, are quite different in their intent and content. They form a practical realistic guide for actual governing, and illustrate the necessity of political insight, historical perspective and common sense in dealing with men and nations. This section of the study will examine these key documents, will look at the fortuitous events that allowed the development of certain political myths that have fueled the dilemma, and will then study the eras of varying predominance of each side of the conflict. The common ground circumscribed by the two factors will be identified, and lastly, the applicability of this dilemma to the case in question will be stated.

The justification for the original colonies break with England is stated in the Declaration of Independence. While not citing specific incidents, it is primarily a list of offenses by the crown against its citizens in America. However, it is the first two paragraphs that set the stage for the great dilemma. Written almost entirely by Thomas

Jefferson (with only minor editing from others) the Declaration has been used to link America with reformers, revolutionaries and moralists ever since.

John Adams, who supposedly was to co-write the document with Jefferson, but deferred to him, stated later, "take away from the Declaration of Independence its self evident truths, and you rob the North American Revolution of all its moral principles."⁶ While nowhere does it state that the new nation founded by the issuance of the Declaration had the responsibility to insure that all men are given the opportunity to be free, many feel it is implied. From the French Revolution to the Sandinistas, revolutionary groups have claimed that America should support them, because they also agree with the opening lines of the Declaration of Independence. Throughout our history Americans would point toward those words to justify support of a group or nation, and to damn any policy supporting groups that appear to oppose these lofty ideals. In 1858, a man dismissed the Declaration of Independence as a collection of "glittering generalities", to which Ralph Waldo Emerson replied, "glittering generalities! say rather blazing ubiquities!"⁷ Few would disagree as to the importance of those words in establishing the ideological underpinnings of the new United States. The question that arises for the policy maker, is "to what degree should ideology constrain the latitude for action?" Is it broad and directional or narrow and targeting in nature?

Other than giving the President the power "to make treaties" and "appoint ambassadors", the Constitution itself says very little about

foreign policy. However, if one looks at the preamble, an interesting hypothesis can be made. The five reasons stated for establishing the Constitution all aim at benefitting the United States. As stated earlier, this is a quite different tract than the older Declaration of Independence. There is no talk of "all men" or any thing else that could be construed as espousing universal values. It puts the interest of America as its great objective. To analyze the position of the framers of the Constitution, one must look at the collection of essays, written by James Madison, John Jay and Alexander Hamilton, known in their total as The Federalist Papers. There are four of the 85 essays that deal directly with foreign nations and our relations with them. The comments, written by Jay (one of the negotiators of the treaty with England and our original Secretary of Foreign Affairs), are in the form of illustrating the need for a federal government. In this context, he adeptly shows, that in his opinion and that of his colleagues, it is national interest that is the dominant factor in foreign relations.

In the Federalist No. 3, he immediately shows his totally practical nature by contending "Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their safety seem to be first."⁸ If this is true, then the function of our government is to insure safety, and safety is clearly in the realm of interests. He goes on to acknowledge the existence and primacy of power politics in the world. He does this in a way that recognizes the fact that America must be prepared to participate in that world. "Besides, it is well known that acknowledgments, explanations, and compensations are often accepted as satisfactory from a strong united nation, which would

be rejected as unsatisfactory if offered by a state or confederacy of little consideration or power."⁹ Again, while showing regret, he states, "It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature, that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting anything by it."¹⁰ His entire justification for a strong federal government is to have an agency capable of standing up to other nations in the battle for achievement of national interest, of which the primary goal is peace.

Jay contended there was only one way of ensuring peace, and it had nothing to do with the spread of democracy or the universal values of the Declaration of Independence. "Wisely, therefore, do they consider union and a good national government as necessary to put and keep them in such a situation as instead of inviting war, will tend to repress and discourage it. That situation consists in the best possible defense, and necessarily depends on the government, the arms, and the resources of the country."¹¹ In short, a nation that has sufficient power to defend itself probably won't have to. He further goes on to say that, "What ever our situation, certain it is, that foreign nations will know and view it exactly as it is, and they will act towards us accordingly. If they see our national government is efficient and well administered, our trade prudently regulated, our military properly organized and disciplined, our people free, contented and united, they will be much more disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke our resentment."¹² Clearly, Publius (pen name of the three authors) is a practical man that would have to be characterized today as a believer in power politics realism. These men were not dreamers or visionaries in

the utopian sense, but pragmatic political theorists with an obvious grasp of the nature of men and nations.

In a more overt recognition of the importance of interests in guiding policy, Jay used these words in discussing the result of splitting the United States into several confederations, "Instead of their being 'joined in affection' and free from all apprehension of differing 'interests', envy and jealousy would soon extinguish confidence and affection; and the partial interests of each confederacy, instead of the general interests of all America would be the only objects of their policy and pursuits."¹³ This has two implications. First, in a hypothetical situation of several confederations joined together by common threads (i.e., the Declaration of Independence, the Revolution, English background, etc.), the interests of each confederation would soon be the overriding factor in all their policy. Second, by lamenting over that potential outcome, he implies that the "general interests of all America" is what should be paramount, and it is obviously the role of the Federal Government to promote them.

In this same vein, he shows that even treaties between sovereign bodies (his hypothetical confederacies) might not hold them together if it violates their interests. "An alliance so contrary to their immediate interests would not therefore be easy to form, nor, if formed would it be observed and fulfilled with perfect good faith."¹⁴ If these confederacies which have multitudes of things to bind them together are held to be open to ignoring these ties in the pursuit of interests, surely nations with only minimal commonalities are even more likely to

put national interests first. Jay's comments are aimed at his overly optimistic contemporaries that simply could not see that the role of a national government naturally and correctly is the protection and promotion of the interests of it's people.

The problems that developed as a result of this conflict cannot be blamed solely on the documents and their very different orientations. There are certain peculiarities in the experience of America as a nation that cannot be overlooked. These have been particularly critical in the development of the attitudes and opinions of the general public as well as policy elites. Three of these aspects are of particular importance. The first being the uniqueness of the entire endeavor called the United States of America. No nation before or since has had an experience quite like the American one. Next is the very real isolation, both geographically and politically from Europe that occurred, particularly during the 19th century. Lastly, was the perception of America's humanitarian pacifism and anti-imperialistic "mission".¹⁵

The first two areas coincide to a degree. An important aspect of the American experience was our conscious decision to break from traditional European politics. In his farewell address, Washington stated, "Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation."¹⁶ By withdrawing from the continuous struggles in Europe, we withdrew in principle from power politics. Out of this, the belief grew that we never practiced this type of action until contemporary times. As we shall see, this was not altogether true. The other connection between the uniqueness and isolation was contributed by

our geostrategic position. With the exception of the War of 1812, we were able to expand across a continent without foreign interference. We also developed a highly superior attitude about our system, versus others, because we established the freest and wealthiest nation in the world "without any" imperial conquest or displacement of other peoples. People began to use the westward expansion as proof of the superiority of the "American Way". They claimed that the settlement of the continent was an act of civilization, not conquest. This, therefore, made it different from the imperialistic forays and colonial acquisitions of other nations. However, it was less an inherent moral superiority than very fortunate circumstances. There were no oceans to cross, or civilized nations with armies to fight.

Many people looked at the power politics of Europe as the method of the aristocracy, and that it was directly opposed to all things American. This allowed Americans to draw the conclusion that one of America's "missions" was to eventually "wipe out" the inherently evil practice of seeking after power and replace it with morally pure democracy. It is clear from history, that in fact, America was just as much an imperialist power as its European neighbors. Also that they were firmly in the business of power politics, actively in the Western hemisphere and passively in Europe and Asia. They had a vested interest in maintaining the balance of power and took steps to do so. However, it is not so important at this juncture to determine what we were doing or not doing, but what the perception of our actions were. Many attribute the call made by Washington in his farewell address to avoid all entanglements, to be based on a desire to keep America unsoiled by the

political mud of Europe. A closer reading, that was obviously lost on the majority of Americans, shows that his advice was based on the interests of the nation, which at that time happened to coincide with staying away from Europe.

He further states "... we may choose peace or war as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel...", and later, "Harmony, liberal intercourse with all nations are recommended by policy, humanity, and interest".¹⁷ Clearly, the moralists and those that deride power politics heard only half the message. It was simply not in America's interests to get involved in European politics, even for moral reasons. Above all else, interest was Washington's guide.

Regardless of the words of our first president, the general public and many key leaders soon lost the course that was being steered by the early Federalists. Taking the Declaration of Independence, and our "special situation" of separation from Europe and "non-imperialistic" expansion, a conclusion was soon reached that has had a great influence on the dicotomy we are addressing. Our way was different and superior to everyone else's (mainly Europe). Therefore, we should be guided by this higher calling in our dealings with other nations.

As we trace the degree of realism and idealism, an interesting pattern develops. The dichotomy never disappears, but the relative importance of each side varies considerably. The major eras that characterize the nation's history with regard to the orientations of the practitioners of foreign policy will be addressed from the beginning to

the present. In addition to defining these periods and describing the major thrusts of the leaders at that time, a representative of each will be described.

VARYING PREDOMINANCE

Now that the factors that lead to the policy dilemma have been identified and looked at, the next step is to trace the varying degree of predominance of each factor throughout our nation's history. The first round of the continuing struggle between practical realists and idealists was joined in the ratification fight over the Constitution, essentially, from that point on, three types of American political thinkers have emerged as our national leaders. These are the realists, the pragmatic idealists, and the pure idealists. These will be defined as realists thinking and acting in terms of interests, pragmatic idealists thinking in terms of moral principles but still acting in terms of interests, and finally pure idealists thinking and acting in terms of moral principles. This simplification will allow us to see how these two conflicting viewpoints have effected past policy.

The first period of our history was characterized by a realist orientation. The victory of the Federalists ensured that we would be totally practical in our view of the world and would consider America first. As stated earlier, many have pointed to Washington's advice against entanglement with Europe based on a moral judgment condemning power politics. On the contrary, it was a practical judgment based on

the national interest. Three years earlier, in 1793, Washington proclaimed America's neutrality in the War of the First Coalition. In that engagement, England, Prussia, Austria, Sardinia, and the Netherlands were opposing revolutionary France. At the time, America had a treaty of alliance with France. Many people greatly opposed our neutrality in the war, claiming we had strong moral reasons for supporting the French. These points included, upholding treaty obligations, support of a similar sympathetic political system, and gratitude for France's help during our own revolution. In defense of Washington's position, Alexander Hamilton wrote two pieces, the so called, "Pacificus" and "Americanus" articles. In them, he eloquently showed the primacy of national interests over unwise moral arguments.

To the moral obligation to uphold the treaty, Hamilton points out the unbalance between the possible negative effects on the United States and the positive help we could offer France. He goes on to say "This disproportion would be a valid reason for not executing the guarantee. All contracts are to receive a reasonable construction. Self preservation is the first duty of a nation".¹⁸ He goes on to acknowledge that in relation to war, nations that make agreements must be prepared to run risks, "yet it does not require that extraordinary and extreme hazards should be run".¹⁹

He next dismisses gratitude as a justification for any relation between nations. Gratitude is felt for an action that was done without regard for future cooperation and without the recipient deserving it. If an act is done with an eye on reciprocal action in the future, gratitude

never gets involved. In as clear a statement of the primacy of national interest as can be found, Hamilton states, "It may be affirmed as a general principle, that the predominant motive of the good offices from one nation to another, is the interests or advantage of the nation which performs them".²⁰ Then he explains the stronger duty of the nation to use it's own welfare as a guide, as opposed to an individual. Individuals can indulge in generosity and benevolence, but nations can only do so within strict limitations. These he defines as, "good offices which are indifferent to the interest of a nation performing them, or which are compensated by the existence of expectation of some reasonable equivalent or which produce an essential good to the nation which they are rendered without real detriment to the affairs of the benefactors".²¹

Once again, Hamilton confirms that it is the national interest that acts as the guide.

The final argument is a familiar one to contemporary times, that of support due to commonality of cause or system. Washington's critics claimed "that the cause of France is the cause of liberty; and that we are bound to assist that nation on the score of their being engaged is the defense of that cause".²² Hamilton, not at all caught up in any emotion calmly answers, "the obligation to assist the cause of liberty must be deduced from the merits of that cause and from the interest we have in its support".²³ There is no blanket endorsement and assistance merely because the French claim their cause is in support of liberty. Hamilton's realism comes shining through. A thorough examination of the French case must be made, to determine if their claim of liberty is a

true one. He points out two aspects that must be considered before we could decide to support France (these are still an excellent guide):

"I. Whether the cause of France be truly the cause of liberty, pursued with justice and humanity and in a manner likely to crown it with honorable success.

II. Whether the degree of service we could render, by participating in the conflict was likely to compensate, by its utility to the cause, the evils which would probably flow from it to ourselves."²⁴

For Hamilton, a negative answer for either question meant no participation. Not only did he call for proof of this asserted ideological bond, but he repeated his assertion that our national interest held sway.

As this example shows, the first decade or so of our nationhood was characterized by a realist perspective. President Washington clearly agreed more consistently with his Secretary of the Treasury (Hamilton) than his Secretary of State (Jefferson).²⁵ However, with the defeat of the Federalists, the second phase of American policy orientation began. It was to last until the Spanish American War. The classic examples of the era of pragmatic idealists were Thomas Jefferson and John Quincy Adams.

The label given this period appears to be and in fact is a contradiction in terms. This is intended, since the period was marked by contradiction. The beliefs espoused by Hamilton and Jay in fact continued to guide the policy makers and their decisions. The change occurred because, beginning with Jefferson, our statesmen invoked moral principles to prove the validity and righteousness of their actions and policies. Thankfully, even though there was an apparent discrepancy between thought and action, the results seemed to satisfy both. So, for these men "what moral law demanded was by felicitous coincidence always identical with what the national interest seemed to require".²⁶

This tension is sharply apparent in Jefferson, the author of the Declaration of Independence, a man dedicated to abstract morality. He felt that his election as president vindicated his disagreement with Washington and Hamilton.²⁷ However, despite this strong position, he seldom failed to yield to national interest when there was a conflict. Looking at a series of statements by Jefferson concerning the various sides in the Napoleonic Wars, then show a constant shifting from one side to the other. This reflects a realization of the changing balance of power and its potential effect on the United States, far more than it reflects unchanging moral principles. In 1806 he desired "an English ascendancy on the ocean" because it was "safer for us than that of France." By 1807, he had reversed his position. "I never expected to be under the necessity of wishing success to Bonaparte. But the English being equally tyrannical at sea as he is on land and that tyranny bearing on us in every point of either honor or interest, I say 'down with England' and as for what Bonaparte is then to do to us, let us trust to

the chapter of accidents, I cannot, with the Anglomens, prefer a certain present evil to a future hypothetical one."²⁸

Napoleon was at the height of his power in 1812, and the now retired Jefferson looked for a return to the balance of power. He stated "We especially ought to pray that the powers of Europe may be so poised and counterpoised among themselves that their own security may require the presence of all their forces at home." He added, with regard to England, a hope, "that she should be a sensible and independent weight in the scale of nations ..."²⁹, that would help maintain that balance. Finally, while not wanting Napoleon to capture all of Russia, he hoped he would control and close the Baltic Sea to the British. This was in the hope of ending British aggressions on the sea.

All of these changes of position were predicated on a recognition of where our national interests lay. After the threat to the balance of power was past (1815), Jefferson returned to his old position. He once again espoused and championed moral principles divorced from political realities.

While Jefferson's pragmatic idealism may have required him to shift between two seemingly opposing points of view, John Quincy Adams did not have that problem. He was extremely well versed in the realist tradition, but he had worked extensively in the environment of Jeffersonian principles. Consequently, he managed to blend both together, until they were in agreement. For Adams, "the moral principles were nothing, but the political interests formulated in moral terms and vice versa".³⁰ Adams' greatest contributions to American policy were

clearly actions that were in America's best interests, and they were all justified by "morally correct" principles. These contributions included freedom of the seas, manifest destiny and the Monroe Doctrine.

Freedom of the seas for all nations is obviously a legal and moral right. The high seas are neutral and should be open to all who wish to use them. Few could argued with this point. It was, however, also critical to the growth and expansion of our young nation that we be free from the domination of the sea by Great Britain. Our budding industries needed that freedom to grow and without it we were doomed to being a second class power in the world.

Even the name "Manifest Destiny" is a moral justification. It sanctioned and encouraged our westward expansion and "civilization" of the wilderness and it's peoples. As discussed earlier, the ease with which this was accomplished had less to do with it being our destiny than with the highly advantageous circumstances. While the validity of "Manifest Destiny" may be questioned, its results, clearly in our national interests, cannot be. Few principles, given under the rubric of morally correct action, have been also so obviously in our national interests. Without it, the westward expansion would have undoubtedly taken place anyway, but the elucidation of the concept literally propelled the nation across the continent.

The Monroe Doctrine remains as the best example of pragmatic idealism. We have always sought to protect our special position in this hemisphere. It quickly became obvious that the United States was the

predominant power and would remain so. No other American country or group of countries could challenge or threaten this position without assistance from outside the hemisphere. Thus it has always been in our interests to discourage any non-American nation from having any undue interest in the area. The two ways that were most likely to produce such an interest were intertwined with other issues. First, if one European nation could boast a predominance of power, it might be inclined to look across the ocean in our direction. Thus was born our constantly shifting specific support, that in general hoped to maintain the balance of power (see Jefferson's statement in 1812). Second, for a foreign nation to look greedily at our hemisphere, territorial acquisition was within it. This could have been an eventual threat to American dominance. The Monroe Doctrine, was stated in the terms of moral principles; these being, "anti imperialism and mutual non-intervention". Highly laudable terms, which probably reflected the true feelings of President Monroe and His Secretary of State (Adams). But compliance with the doctrine would obviously benefit the United States far more than anyone else. To this day, students of foreign affairs can point to this policy as one of the most comfortable marriages of principles and interests in our history.³¹

So Jefferson and Adams demonstrated, that as pragmatic idealists, they had inherited a grasp of the importance of national interests from their realist predecessors. However, while this pattern still guided our policy, our leaders were seldom inclined to point to interests as their justification. They had been replaced by the use of moral principles that purported to be divorced from such sordid European considerations as interests. This combination worked very well for the remainder of the

19th century, until President McKinley ushered in the next major trend in policy orientation, that of the pure idealists.

The Spanish American War itself could be analyzed in pragmatic idealist terms. We justified our intervention as a morally just cause fueled by a crusading zeal to free the Carribean from Spanish tyranny.³² But we very much acted in our national interest, as evidenced by our acquisition of a great deal of "valuable and coveted territory".³³ Further, it solidified control by the United States over the Carribean area by removing Spain. It was, however, at the conclusion of the war that the transition occurred.

Our domination of the former Spanish territory in the Western Hemisphere was never in question, it clearly fell within our "national interests" and could be easily justified by our desire for stability and development in the area. The Phillippines however was a different case. Our historic interests gave no real guidance for action involving areas outside our hemisphere or Europe. McKinley had no precedent in deciding the status of the islands. So, when one half of the formula was lacking he turned to the other half for help. His own stated reason for the annexation of the Phillippines was that he had sought the Lord in prayer and after many hours heard His voice. It told him to annex the islands.³⁴ This began the period when idealism was no longer merely the justification for policies, but was the actual source and guide for them.

Woodrow Wilson is the best example of this phase of our foreign policy history. He not only refused to use "material interests" as a guide, but he felt it was morally wrong to do so. In 1913 he stated, "It is a very perilous thing to determine the foreign policy of a nation in the terms of material interest."³⁵ It might be argued that his part in involving the United States in the first World War was an act similar to Jefferson's bowing to political realities. However, it was a different case. While entering the war to restore the balance of power in Europe supported our "interests", this was never Wilson's reason. He led us in to war to eliminate the balance of power system forever, not perpetuate it! He wanted to make the world safe for democracy. His action was correct, but his rationale for doing it was not. The results of his error did not really appear until the peace.

Since he had been guided by a moral desire to end the "forever discredited" balance of power system, Wilson's vision of the peace could never include that system. To replace it, he offered a world view where everyone's interests were the same, thus eliminating the cause of conflict; competing national interests. He stated, "national purposes have fallen more and more into the background, and the common purpose of enlightened mankind has taken their place. The counsel of plain men have become on all hands, more simple and straightforward and more unified than the counsels of sophisticated men of affairs, who shall retain the impression that they are playing a game of power and playing for high stakes", and, "statesman must follow the clarified common thought or be broken."³⁶ His failure to accomplish this lofty goal must have been a bitter disappointment to him.

The other nations of the world did not share Wilson's vision and consequently did what national leaders are selected to do, pursue their nation's best interests. In the ensuing negotiations, the results satisfied no one, Wilson was forced to compromise his principles, the national aspirations of many were frustrated and the peace settlement was untenable. The legislators of this nation obviously had a slightly better grasp of things than Wilson, the "expert", as demonstrated by their refusal to ratify the League of Nations Covenant.

Between the wars a new debate raged that purported to be between Wilsonian idealism and the so called realist isolationists. The Wilsonians were clearly pure idealists as we have defined them, but the isolationists claimed to have returned to the tradition of the founding fathers. They, however, failed to understand a critical point in the thinking of those first leaders. The isolationists saw the policies of Washington and Hamilton as being based on the morality of staying out of European politics. Therefore, they were guided by the moral correctiveness of the natural state of American isolation. They did not comprehend that the old Federalists had made a conscious decision that involvement was against our national interests, and isolation supported those interests. Had the political realities been reversed, so would their policy have been reversed. In their own way, the isolationists were also pure idealists, they merely misread history to reach their conclusions, while Wilsonians misread everything. Both schools were equally divorced from the true interests of the nation, in thought and action.

This trend continued, until the end of the Second World War. The saving grace of Roosevelt was that his moral principles happened (as with Wilson in the first World War) to fall in perfect harmony with the true interests of the nation. Thus the overall policy of joining the war on the allied side was in our interest. The failure once again came as peace approached. The "new world" where Roosevelt would be able to "control" Stalin and there would be no need for the projection of power never materialized. The Allies failed to use "war as an extension of policy by other means" as Von Clausewitz had wisely advised, in addition to the defeat of the Axis powers. Little thought was given to the future peace, and when it arrived the pure idealist orientation would no longer prove adequate to the task.

The Truman years and those following it saw a return to the pragmatic idealist position. The reality of the Soviet threat forced the leaders of our nation to resurrect the realist point of view as a guide for action. Programs such as the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were justified by moral principles of help for our allies and friends and promoting democracy,³⁷ but they were very definitely in our national interests. While many truly believed that the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe was morally repugnant and had to be opposed on those grounds, our leaders were never willing to endanger the welfare of this nation to back up their beliefs.

During the Eisenhower administration, the policies of John Foster Dulles show this very well. Dulles considered Communism to be a rival faith to the Judeo Christian values and beliefs of the western world and

America.³⁸ Utilizing this justification, he endeavored to fight Communism everywhere he could. He oversaw the "High-Cold War" with it's much intensified brinksmanship. He truly believed (reminiscent of John Quincy Adams) that in this instance his moral principles were in perfect alignment with our national interests. However, when the Soviets put down the Hungarian uprising with such brutality and disregard for all rules of sovereignty, he made no move to interfere other than diplomatic ones. His fervent desire to "roll back" the Iron Curtain was never backed with action, not because it wasn't a true and morally correct goal, but because it would have gone against all of our national interests to attempt it.

This return to pragmatic idealism continued through the Johnson administration. Even when the President felt it was in our interests to commit troops to Viet Nam, he waited until the Tonkin Gulf incident so he would have the moral justification on which to act.³⁹ However, the next two presidential terms produced a true aberration in the orientation of our foreign policy.

During the Nixon and Ford administrations, there was a return to a realist orientation. The influences of Henry Kissinger and Nixon himself were overwhelming. National interest was recognized as both the guide for action and the justification as well. This return to the orientation of our first leaders produced some tremendous foreign policy coups, and increased our prestige among other nations, despite the unpopular Viet Nam War. This might have been the beginning of a permanent return to this most effective and utilitarian method, had it not been for one

aspect. Unlike the founding fathers, Nixon and Kissinger took the writing of Machiavelli and Hobbes literally when they said that "any action by the ruler, in the national interest is acceptable."⁴⁰ Washington and Hamilton simply never took the issue this far. Actions such as breakins, surveillance, and other violations of domestic laws and civil rights, blatant falsehoods about actions taken (Cambodia) and failures to observe statutory provisions for foreign aid (Turkey after Cyprus) all combined to discredit and degrade very valid policy orientations. No leader in a republic can violate the law of the land, claiming national interest, and truly expect to long survive. The unfortunate aspect of these latter actions, for the long term good of the nation's foreign policy, was the backlash that this period created. It was this backlash against the realist orientation deemed immoral or at best amoral, not because of the policies, but because of tangential actions to them, that would bring Jimmy Carter to office and a return of pure idealism.

President Carter may have been the most idealistic leader this nation has had since Wilson. He was guided by idealistic principles that not only failed to promote the interests of the nation, but, in many cases, were opposed to them. It was only at the close of his term in office that a degree of pragmatism began to reappear. The administration's stand on human rights is the most obvious example. While the stand itself was quite consistent with the ideals of the Declaration of Independence, the application of it shows an extremely short sighted and naive view of the world. The Carter administration's desire to not fuel

the arms race and to promote self determination also left much to be desired.⁴¹

In both Iran and Nicaragua, right wing autocrats held power. They were oppressive and were not likely to release the reins of power of their own accord. They were however, very much Pro-American and anti-communist. Except for occasional criticism for violations of civil and human rights, both rulers (the Shah and General Somoza) were considered loyal friends of the United States and were treated that way. In each country, when opposition to their regimes, that had an overtly anti-American nature began, the attitude of the Carter administration changed. Assuming, from the presence of vocal opposition, that there was wide spread discontent, the administration began applying pressure to the governments to change and compromise. Again, believing that the opposition represented a broad spectrum of the people, including a large moderate segment, Carter's men pushed the autocrats harder, withholding aid, as a lever to encourage them to cooperate with those peoples trying to replace them. The end result in each case was the "replacement of moderate autocrats friendly to American interests with less friendly autocrats of extremist persuasion".⁴² In neither case is there any indication that anything even close to a constitutional government will develop. If anything, the internal situations are worse now than before. So America, on behalf of human rights, and based on a questionable perception of the will of the local population, actively acted against our own interest. The hostage situation in Iran, present terrorist activities and the export of Nicaraguan revolution are all the result of this failed policy.

In a dramatic turn about from the Nixon-Kissinger years, President Carter and his national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski tried to establish the supremacy of "global politics and interdependence." Calling for a substitution of the preoccupation with national supremacy for 'global perspectives', and the acknowledgment of international problems as human issues, they wanted to return to pure idealism.⁴³ In Brzezinski's book, written in 1970, he stated, "Today, the old framework of international politics ... with spheres of influence, military alliances between nation states, the fiction of sovereignty, doctrinal conflicts arising from 19th Century crisis - is clearly no longer compatible with reality."⁴⁴ He also states,... "it would be wise for the United States to abandon the Monroe Doctrine ⁴⁵ and to have a great deal of patience, a more detached attitude toward world revolutionary process and less anxious preoccupation with the Soviet Union".⁴⁶

Soviet influence in the world was greater at the end of Carter's term than any other time in history, particularly in the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, Southern Africa, the Caribbean, and Central America. At the same time, despite massive efforts to "make friends" in the Third World, we had less influence than before it began.⁴⁷

One critic of the administration put it this way; "Inconsistencies are a familiar part of politics in most societies. Usually, governments behave hypocritically when their principles conflict with the national interest. What made the inconsistencies of the Carter administration noteworthy was, first the administrations moralism, which rendered it especially vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy; and second, the

administrations predilection for policies that violated the strategic and economic interests of the United States".⁴⁸ Carter did not have a World War with an obviously "evil" enemy (as did Wilson and Roosevelt), to help him match his moral principles to the interests of the nation. Consequently he went about trying to bring into being a new world order that was akin to Wilson's vision. His failure was also similar. But the "lessons of Viet Nam", the "immoral" actions of his predecessors, and an unfortunately mistaken view that man is inherently good, all combined to mislead him as to the validity of his pure idealist position. This resulted in his far from credible performance.

Failures of the Carter administration to meet the needs of the nation helped put Ronald Reagan in office. Reagan falls in the pragmatic idealist orientation. He acts in the interests of the United States firmly believing in the validity of the moral principles with which he justifies those actions. His policy toward Nicaragua is an example. The presence of the Communist government of the Sandinista regime, with its close ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union and overt support of other communist insurgencies in the area, is clearly contrary to the best interests of the United States. Even more so than Cuba, because of its location, this hostile nation's continued activity could threaten to destabilize the entire heart of Central America. The President has taken steps, within the law, to pressure the regime, and, if possible, replace it with one more likely to be a supportive friend. His justification is readily provided by the Sandinistas themselves as they continue to suppress freedom, religion and the democratic process while attempting to

subvert other nations. The moral justifications align with the interests.

THE DILEMMA IN THE GREEK CASE

The dilemma of interests versus idealist principles was readily apparent in the case of the Greek Junta in 1967. In the birthplace of democracy, a group of right wing military officers usurped the authority of the constitutional government of Greece, by force of arms. Some contended that there was no dilemma in this case, there should have been an immediate and unfavorable reaction, Greece was a NATO ally, a Western European nation (by habitual association), not some "banana republic" off in the far corner of the world. The pretenders and villains should have been forced out by all the World's democracies. But is it that simple a case? Greece was in the midst of a period of relative instability politically. Between 1965 and 1967 the King remained in his position, but Prime Ministers and cabinets were rotating with alarming speed. No one seemed to be able to hold a coalition together for any length of time. The more liberal elements of the Centrist party were gaining power. The conservatives, in control since the war, were slipping. The man most likely to return to power in the coming election was George Papandreou, a moderate, with some old, ill feelings toward the United States. He and his son Andreas, who led the liberal wing of his father's party, were the ones the military would later point to as the greatest threat to the Greek nation.

It was in this environment, which will be further enlarged upon below, that the military acted. A group of officers seized power, leaving the King in place, and claimed staunch support of NATO and the United States. The quickness and efficiency with which they seized and consolidated their gains, was ample evidence of the Junta's capabilities, serious intent and unity, and conversely the weakness of any opposition.

At that point, U.S. policy makers looked at this situation, and had to decide what to do. Morally, it was clear, this entire action was not in the spirit of Western democracy. But the U.S. now had very conservative, supportive military men to work with instead of the constant stream of different civilian politicians of the previous two years. The prospect of alienating a nation considered critical to NATO's "soft underbelly" was not a pleasant one. There were several vital American facilities in and around Greece. Any situation that threatened our access to those facilities was a grave one indeed. What did the American policy makers do? Was it based on idealism or interests? As far as overt action, they in fact did very little, which has been interpreted, for good or bad, as meaning a great deal. To fully understand and analyze the United States policy toward the Junta we must first begin earlier.

CHAPTER III

CASE STUDY: U. S. GREEK RELATIONS

BACKGROUND

To put the period under consideration into perspective, a brief historical picture must be presented. At the end of the Second World War, the British, and Churchill in particular, insisted on a return of the monarchy in Greece. They were instrumental in setting up a coalition government headed by George Papandreou, while the King remained waiting in the wings. The return from exile of the new government included a return from Egypt of predominately pro-royalist troops as well. The Communist Party of Greece (KKE) had formed the most effective resistance against the Nazis, and was the guiding force of the National Liberation Front (EAM). EAM agreed to participate in the new government, but trouble soon arose. The same organization and forces were now rallied to resist the return of the royalists. Beginning with the battle of Athens, the bloody civil war would last until mid 1949.

Even prior to this period, there were strongly anti-communist elements within the military. It was during the exile in North Africa that the Sacred Union of Greek Officers (IDEA) was founded. Several prominent members of IDEA would play key roles in the coup.⁴⁹ The more liberal elements of the Army and Navy mutinied to support the temporary government set up by EAM in 1944, but the mutiny was put down, and those involved were later purged from the military.

The Civil War was a classic example of fratricidal madness, as atrocities were evident on both the right and left sides of the conflict. Mass murders, attributed to the left lead to random counter terror, by

the royalists. Even the abduction of thousands of Greek children by the communists as they retreated marked this sad period.⁵⁰ The result was a totally polarized society. The military was left with a deep fear and hatred for anything even close to the left wing politically.

In 1947, the British pulled out of Greece and were replaced by the United States under the auspices of the Truman Doctrine. Massive military and financial aid poured into the country. By 1949 the communists had been defeated and the country returned to a degree of normalcy. But it was to be a period of strict authoritarian rule.

From 1950 to 1963, the nation was led by fairly stable, very conservative, right wing governments under a constitutional monarchy. There were two prime ministers during this period, Field Marshall Alexander Papagos and Mr. Constantine Karamanlis. The economy steadily improved, with the gross national product rising at 6-8 per cent each year.⁵¹ Karamanlis was particularly instrumental in this result. The United States continued to provide aid, and it was at this time that American penetration and influence reached its zenith. The degree of this penetration and its effect will be looked at later in the study.

In 1963, a series of disputes over the wisdom of certain state visits, occurred between the King and Prime Minister Karamanlis. The result of these disputes was that Karamanlis resigned.⁵² Elections were held, but Karamanlis did not run, choosing instead to retire.⁵³ This action left the conservatives without a viable candidate, and combined with the Greek peoples desire for a change, brought George Papandreou

into office. Papandreou, the leader of the moderate Center Union Party, won by a wide margin.

Under Papandreou, the economy began to slip. The Center Union officials employed even more political patronage than was the norm, as they tried to make up for many years without power.⁵⁴ The slip may have been due to Papandreou's less cautious, but much needed programs for change. At the same time, there developed a highly controversial 'affair' concerning the infiltration of the Army by a "left wing" officers movement, known as ASPIDA (Shield). The purpose of this group was to promote ideas different from those (left of) that currently predominated in the military. The most controversial aspect of the entire affair was the group's alleged political leader, Andreas Papandreou. Papandreou is an American educated economist (formerly an American citizen and officer in the US Navy), who at the time was the leader of the liberal section of the Center Union Party.⁵⁵

In the ensuing controversy, the prime ministrer fired his Defense Minister over his handling of the 'affair', and named himself to the portfolio in addition to his other duties. Young King Constantine, (his father Paul had died suddenly) exercised his constitutional authority to oversee all ministerial appointments and refused to approve the move. Given no other choice, Papandreou resigned in July 1965.⁵⁶

The Center Union was split over the issue, with most standing behind Papandreou and another group supporting the King. It was alleged that these men had made agreements with the King even before the Prime

Minister's resignation. In any case, the political right rallied behind the King and his new Centrist supporters.

The King immediately appointed a caretaker cabinet that consisted of the Center Union "Apostates", as they were called by the remainder of their party.⁵⁷ Their "government" was very short lived, as the parliament, where the Center Union Party had a controlling majority, refused to ratify the appointments. And the same result occurred with next set of appointees. On the third try a cabinet was finally approved. During this process, many promises of ministerial portfolios and some "more material inducements" traded hands, before the needed support could be gained.⁵⁸ This governing group remained in power until the beginning of 1967 when the King dismissed them.⁵⁹ The economy had continued to slip, and there was a great deal of pressure from the right to share in the power they had helped create through their support. A fourth caretaker government was appointed to supervise elections in mid-1967. It was a coalition that had the support of Papandreou and other moderates of the Center Union.

This shaky coalition fell apart within a few months. The more liberal elements of the Center Union Party, led by Andreas Papandreou continued to rail against the King, the military and his own father for compromising. The ensuing tension was too much and the King was forced to appoint a fifth government to run the elections.

The military was very conservative and strongly anti-communist. IDEA, as mentioned above, claimed most prominent officers as at least members, if not activists.⁶⁰ This feeling had grown out of the Civil War, in which many had fought, and the "Red Terror" atrocities that most

had experienced. This was one of the main themes that was reinforced in all military schools and led to the development of a "messianic, populist nationalism." Also, based on the Civil War experience, the military were fervent supporters of the monarchy; this was the "other side" of the war with the communists.⁶¹

There was a particularly zealous pro-NATO stand taken by the officer corps. They looked at the NATO agreement as a sacred pact against communism. The interests of the army and the nation were particularly intertwined in NATO. Without the NATO support, the military would not survive; without NATO guarantees, the nation would not survive. So the perception was, that any threat to NATO involvement was a threat to national survival.⁶²

PRE-COUP POLICIES AND INVOLVEMENT

United States involvement and policies in Greece, prior to the coup in 1967 can be divided into three main periods. These are: the immediate post war period (1944-1947), the Truman Doctrine to Karamanlis' resignation (1947-1963), and the pre-coup period (1963-1967). These different periods saw American influence and attitudes vary greatly. The policies pursued all had the same general goals, but the methods of obtaining them were anything but constant.

The policy followed during the immediate post-war period was heavily influenced by Franklin D. Roosevelt. He was a pure idealist with regard to his foreign policy, who through his personality and rhetoric

showed "a sense of mission and a dedication to certain political and economic ideals concerning the international system".⁶³ These ideals were the basis of the Atlantic Charter, the Declaration on a Liberated Europe and the United Nations Charter. Roosevelt truly believed in and intended to support such policy goals as sovereign rights and self determination for all liberated countries. He saw the "liberalization and democratization" of Europe as a real mission for the United States. He believed that Stalin could be dealt with as an ally after the war, and that Churchill's fears concerning Eastern Europe were unfounded.

This attitude was the underpinning of American post-war foreign policy. We came out of the war, dedicated to the premise that interference or intervention into the internal policies of our allies (or the liberated states) was not only counter productive, but dangerous, illegal and would lead to tension and violence. Therefore, the United States frequently expressed disapproval of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe and British policy, particularly toward Greece. Their main message to our allies was that the liberated nations should be allowed to follow their own path politically without outside interference.

In December 1944, the Department of State issued a statement that included the following passage:

"The United States policy has always been to refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of other nations. In conformity with this policy, the United States scrupulously refrained from interfering in the affairs of other countries which have been liberated from the Germans. The United States Government will continue to refrain from interference in the affairs of other countries".⁶⁴

The Department of State was particularly vocal in its criticism of the British support for the Greek King, and their attempts to "sell" the King to the people of Greece.⁶⁵ The U.S. position was that the people must be allowed to choose for themselves. Also, there was sharp disagreement, between the U.S. and the British, as to which system would be the most stable and enduring. The U.S. supported a republic, with the British pushing for the monarchical system.

In fact, the Americans, particularly Ambassador Lincoln MacVeagh, firmly believed that the Greeks were very likely to adopt a republican form of government. He once said that they had a "growing itch to try a republic on the American model."⁶⁶ MacVeagh also criticized the British for their handling of the Greeks as if they were "natives under the British Raj."⁶⁷ Even though we recognized the government of the King, we wanted no part of the British "solution" and crushing of the Greek leftists.

U.S. policy consisted of three major points. These were: pushing for liberalization, discouraging coups and insisting on certified elections. In conjunction with all of these, we were uniformly critical of the traditional Greek political leaders, who were considered inadequate. An embassy official at the time commented, "Lack of leadership is certainly what principally ails this country at the present time."⁶⁸ This leadership vacuum was blamed primarily on the pre-war Metaxas dictatorship, with the Second World War and natural attrition by death eliminating an entire generation of leaders.

The fairness of the 1946 elections was considered an absolute necessity. Despite Greek objections, the Americans insisted on foreign observers to ensure that they were free of coercion. They also used this time period to warn the Greeks that any rumored rightist coups would not receive American support or recognition. Any government seizing power through military action or other illegal means would be repudiated.⁶⁹

It was in the area of pushing for liberalization that we continued toward our goal of achieving a liberal democracy, but concurrently strayed from our policy of non-interference. After the 1946 election, boycotted by the left, brought a very conservative government into power, the U.S. began to pressure the Greeks to include more moderate factions in the ruling structures. After subtleties failed the Americans linked continued economic assistance with liberalization.⁷⁰ The intentions were good, but a precedent was set that would result in a growing web of internal intervention that would grow for the next fifteen years.

The Cold War was in full swing. Gone were the high sounding ideals of Roosevelt, (despite the rhetoric of the announcement speech), to be replaced by the need to hold back Communist expansion. The original authorization of aid for both Greece and Turkey was \$400 million, but eventually the combined economic and military aid programs would total in the billions.⁷¹ This became the primary lever of U.S. influence in Greece. The promise of close management of all aid, that Truman gave to Congress to get their support, opened the door for massive interference along with massive aid. Several items will illustrate the extent of the penetration into Greek institutions and structures of government. There

is sufficient evidence available to show that these were not isolated incidents, but even if they were, the magnitude of the incident is such that alone they would constitute an abnormally high level of domestic penetration.

The first incident is rooted in an intra-agency dispute concerning the deliniation of duties between the Ambassador MacVeagh, and the American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG) head, Dwight P. Griswold. Griswold had grown so powerful, because of the multitude of activities in which AMAG was involved, that the State Department saw the necessity to point out who was responsible for certain areas of policy implementation. The following is a rather shocking list of areas that the Ambassador was to have a dominant voice:

"(a) Any action by the United States representatives in connection with a change in the Greek Cabinet; (b) Any action by the United States representatives to bring about or prevent a change in the high command of the Greek Armed Forces; (c) Any substantial increase or decrease in the size of the Greek Armed Forces; (d) Any disagreement arising with the Greek or British authorities which, regardless of its source, may impair cooperation between American officials in Greece and Greek and British officials; (e) Any major question involving the relations of Greece with the United Nations or any foreign nation other than the United States; (f) Any major question involving the politics of the Greek government toward Greek political parties, trade unions, subversive elements, rebel armed forces, etc. including questions involving the holding of elections in Greece."72

The shocking aspect of these instructions is that they were issued to our ambassador (not CIA station chief) to an allied sovereign state, not a territory, protectorate or trusteeship.

MacVeagh's successor as Ambassador, John Peurifoy, never hesitated to get involved in all decisions of state. One writer described him as functioning "more as a prime minister than an ambassador."⁷³ His best known escapade (but not the only one) involved a series of public statements warning that unless an American approved electoral system was adopted, there would be adverse effects on U.S. aid. He was condemned in the Greek press for this blatant intrusion into the internal political system, but he persisted. Eventually, the government adopted the recommended system which insured the election of Field Marshall Papagos, the American favored candidate. The galling point of this incident to the Greek people, was that Peurifoy accomplished this maneuver through the use of public statements, not diplomacy.

The role of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is the third incident that clearly shows the extent of U.S. penetration. The Greeks were encouraged to form an intelligence service modeled after our CIA. It was formed, called the KYP, and quickly became expert at ferreting out the infrastructure supporting the communist guerrillas. It also became very adept at political surveillance of all sorts. The CIA worked side by side with the increasingly powerful KYP. Even more interesting is the relationship between the CIA and the Monarchy. The ruling family preferred to work through the CIA rather than the Embassy. In fact, the

Queen, Frederika, once commented that "the diplomats are fairies and half wits."⁷⁴

As the Greek society and economy stabilized, the American penetration eased slightly. This occurred as Papagos and later Karamanlis showed that they could run the country effectively, as well as other structural changes. Greece joined NATO, and responded to more subtle influence. This led to the naming of Karanalis to succeed Papagos.⁷⁵ There seemed no need for the heavy handed aspect of the earlier period, the same ends were being reached without them.

Greece's joining NATO, and signing bilateral base agreements (February 1953), institutionalized the U.S. presence and made it semi-permanent. It was during this time that the U.S. established the numerous bases and installations that still remain in Greece. Greece also showed its commitment to America by supporting the U.N. action in Korea.

The problems during this period consisted mainly of low level items such as the conduct of U.S. personnel in Greece, and the disparity of wealth between the Americans and the Greeks. The major problem that would surface with disturbing regularity was Cyprus. The Greeks perceived a tilt toward the British and Turks in this area, and began to see themselves as second rate allies. This alleged lack of sensitivity toward Greek "territorial rights" would continue to be a thorn in the side of Greek-American relations. The latter half of this period marked by a degree of political development, but the U.S. interference

insured that the Greek government remained well to the right in its orientation.

These two periods can be summarized as follows. During the immediate postwar period, the Greeks dealt mainly with the British. On the whole, our policies were quiet and subtle. They were intended to encourage a liberal, democratic, republic, and were in opposition to the British support of the monarchy. There was interference, but it was at an acceptable level. Beginning with the Truman Doctrine implementation the intervention became overt, heavy handed and pervasive. This practice continued and increased in magnitude until approximately 1952 when we began to perceive less of a need to operate in this manner. While the U.S. still maintained an inordinate degree of influence, Karamanlis in particular began to display some independence in response to the internal political demands. The perceived failure of the U.S. to support the Greeks in Cyprus convinced them of the need to broaden their international ties and begin to become a Western Europe nation not just a TransAtlantic client. The trend toward a more independent, but still allied Greece may have continued, had it not been for the political crisis that began with Karamanlis' resignation in 1963.

When Papandreou was elected Prime Minister, the Americans were not overly pleased. The desire of the late 1940's for moderate governments had given way to a comfortable relationship with the strong center right governments. The Americans wanted a Greek leader that would maintain order, allow a free market economy, be pro-NATO, pro-U.S., and low key on Cyprus.⁷⁶ Papandreou did not promise compliance with these standards.

Two major problems occurred during this period that exacerbated strife between the two nations. The first was Cyprus. Papandreou chose to take a more nationalistic and less NATO oriented stand in this area. He consequently ran headlong into Lyndon Baines Johnson. Papandreou infiltrated over 10,000 LOK commandos (Greek special forces) onto the island "to provide a deterrent to a Turkish invasion."⁷⁷ This was in violation of the Geneva agreements that established Cyprus' sovereignty. He also tried to justify his harder line to Johnson on the grounds of public opinion and parliamentary action. Johnson in discussions with the Greek ambassador had this reply:

"F--- your parliament and your constitution. America is an elephant. Cyprus is a flea. Greece is a flea. If those two fleas don't stop itching the elephant, they may just get whacked by the elephant's trunk, whacked good ...we pay a lot of good American dollars to the Greeks, Mr. Ambassador. If your Prime Minister gives me talk about Democracy, Parliament, and Constitutions, he, his Parliament and his Constitution may not last very long."⁷⁸

This attitude transferred from Johnson to other policymakers, was very prevalent throughout this period. Johnson and the entire administration was immersed in the Viet Nam conflict, everything else was an annoyance and a distraction from the "important" issues. The Americans were impatient and short with any impertinence.

The other major problem was the American "fixation" with Andreas Papandreou. He was seen as a direct threat to United States interests. It got to the point where all newly assigned personnel to the Embassy were required to read an enormous dossier on Andreas that sought to

discredit him on all counts.⁷⁹ This combined with Johnson's ire with the elder Papandreou are pointed to as being responsible, at least indirectly, for the fall of Papandreou's government after 14 months. It is also speculated, with some validity, that this "anti-Papandreou" attitude encouraged the right wing of Greek politics and the King, that the U.S. would be favorably disposed toward any return of the governing process to their end of the political spectrum.

The question of U.S. involvement in the coup itself may never be resolved. The CIA was aware of a planned coup by the highest ranking members of the Greek military, that had the King's support. However, they professed no knowledge of the group of Colonels that executed the April coup, thereby preempting their superior's plans.

The apparent total surprise and confusion of the CIA station chief was evidence to those present of his lack of complicity with the coup planners.⁸⁰ Even those writers that are most critical of the U.S. policy toward Greece do not believe there was any high level involvement with the coup.

The most logical explanation for the CIA's lack of knowledge of a coup, that was led by members of the CIA's counterpart the KYP, is provided by Laurence Stern. He believes that the midrange operatives of the station, who were for the most part Greek Americans may have had some knowledge and passive complicity. Most of these personnel had been in place since the Civil War and were firm backers of the conservative

factions of Greek politics. The coup makers had been noted and tracked, for a period of time, then they dropped from the reports. Stern speculates that these mid-range operatives may have, in fact, deliberately covered up the coup to give it the opportunity to succeed.⁸¹ My sense, based on this and other research, is that there was no official sanction for the colonel's coup before it occurred, and there probably was at least passive support (in the form of failing to expose them) on the part of some operatives within the CIA station.

The major objectives of U.S. policy toward Greece between the end of the Second World War and the 1967 Junta had remained the same. They had not changed despite the changes in administrations or methods of implementing them. These objectives were:

- "1. To have a free hand in operating U.S. and NATO bases and facilities in the area, and denying the Soviets the opportunity to establish it's own bases in the area.
2. To maintain freedom of movement for U.S. and NATO aircraft and shipping through Greek air and sea space while denying it to the Soviets.
3. Maintain a favorable investment climate in Greece.
4. Stabilize Greek-Turkish relations so as not to endanger NATO or U.S. interests in the area."⁸²

These would remain the U.S. objectives, as shall be seen, they were met, but at what cost for the future?

THE COUP D'ETAT

The execution of the coup makes a interesting study all by itself. It was the brainchild of thirteen men. All were combat arms officers in the Army. There were seven Infantry, two Armor and four Artillery officers, several of which had high connections in the intelligence community. They included one brigadier general, five colonels and seven lieutenant colonels. All were Military Academy graduates that were from lower or lower middle class backgrounds.⁸³ Additionally, they were all members of IDEA, in fact very active members since the end of the Second World War.⁸⁴

The units directly involved were rather limited in number, but judging by the outcome, they were quite enough. They included the Army Tank Training School, which was located in Athens. This unit was particularly important because of it's strength and proximity to key installations. The L.O.K. Commandos, the Greek Special Forces, the most highly trained troops in the Greek Army, also played a key role. The cadets of the Military Academy and the Military Police rounded out the units actually participating in the coup.

The plan that was executed was in actuality a NATO contingency plan, that was designed for use in the event of an external threat to Greece. It was called "Operation Prometheus." The conspirators began exactly at midnight (0001 hours 21 April 1967) and by 0600 they were in complete control.

The sequence of events is quite interesting, because of the precision and skill with which they were carried out. By 0200 all government buildings in Athens were occupied, paralyzing all organs of government. The National Broadcasting Institute and the National Telecommunication Organization were also captured. This effectively closed all public communication except for the military radio network. By 0300, all of Athens had been secured, and the national borders had been sealed. Even more importantly, Hellinikon Air Base, the largest facility of its type in the country was under Army control.⁸⁵

The Junta had created a brilliant deception. From the beginning, the King was totally convinced that the entire Army was involved in the coup, not just the relative handful that actually accomplished it. Conversely, they had convinced all the units outside their direct control that the King was behind the Junta completely, and that the orders they were receiving were from the King himself.

The Junta moved swiftly to consolidate their power. By mid-morning on 21 April the King, faced with a fait accompli, signed a decree establishing martial law, which gave the Junta some degree of legitimacy. Five Army generals and the Naval Chief of Staff were forced to retire by 23 April. Five of the fourteen daily newspapers were permanently closed, as were many left wing and moderate journals and magazines. The remaining media was subject to severe censorship. Curfews and strict movement restrictions were imposed. The consolidation was most apparent within the military. By 17 May, eight major generals, seventeen

brigadier generals and hundreds of other officers were forced to retire to eliminate any chance for opposition within the military.⁸⁶

The Junta claimed to have captured several truck loads of weapons, uniforms and equipment that were to be used in an attempted communist take over. This uprising was to begin during a political rally for George Papandreou in Thessalonika on 23 April. Despite promises by Col. Papadopoulos (head of the Junta) himself, no evidence of these captured items was ever produced, but the threatened uprising remained the main Junta justification for the intervention.⁸⁷

U.S. REACTION

In the following section, the actual policy reaction of the U.S. Government toward the Greek Junta will be looked at in detail. This investigation will proceed chronologically. The period from April 1967 (the date of the coup) until December 1967 (the King's counter coup) will be reviewed first. The immediate reaction to the coup and the subject of recognition will play primary importance. Then the period from December 1967 through January 1969 (the end of the Johnson administration). Lastly, January 1969 through September 1970 the first two years of the Nixon administration, (the end of the selective ban on heavy weapons).

The total period covered is of sufficient scope to illustrate both the policies made under "duress" and those in a situation that allowed time for the policy makers to calculate all the options. It also covers

two different administrations (one Democrat and one Republican), which provided an opportunity for a change in policy.

A summary of the policy for the entire period will conclude the section. It should be emphasized, that this will be as factual and objective a presentation of the policy for this period as possible. The analysis and critique will be presented in a subsequent section. Judgment as to the correctness and validity of the policy will be reserved until that point is reached.

As is the case in any emergency situation in a foreign nation, it is the embassy that establishes the initial on the spot reaction. The "Country Team", consisting of the ambassador, the CIA station chief and the head of the military mission, must all pool their expertise and resources to both react and to advise their superiors in Washington as to the correct policy. The reaction of the U.S. Embassy on 21 April 1967, was tentative and halting. They truly didn't know what to do.

The CIA station chief, John W. Maury urged Ambassador Phillip Talbot to push Colonel Papadopoulos to withdraw and turn over power to the King. The Ambassador, however, did little but to instruct the embassy personnel not to talk about the coup with their Greek friends. In all there were three different reactions among each of the three groups of professionals, state, defense, and intelligence.

The foreign service personnel for the most part were ambivalent. This can be attributed to the feedback given to them by Washington, which was mainly a continuation of the impatience and anger reflected by

President Johnson over Cyprus earlier (1964). The coup was an unwelcome distraction of minor consequence, when there were much more important items to worry about, such as Viet Nam and Israel. Consequently the upper level diplomats, particularly Talbot simply floated, unable to give any real direction or purpose to our policy.

The CIA personnel were in the opposite position. Maury knew Papadopoulos and had strong feelings and recommendations as to what we should be doing. He continued his stand for a person to person confrontation with the Junta leader, to tell him in no uncertain terms that the U.S. would not tolerate the dictatorship. In fact, shortly after the coup, Papadopoulos asked for an informal meeting with Maury. Maury offered to go, but Ambassador Talbot would not allow it. Maury felt he could have caused the Junta to back down.⁸⁸

The working level CIA staff and the military personnel for the most part approved of the new government and established informal links, despite the hesitant response of their superiors. The Senior Defense attache', Colonel Marshall did not share the opinion of most of his contemporaries, he characterized the Junta as mutineers with no interest in saving their country.⁸⁹

There was one act, that would have far reaching effects, much greater than its originators intended. There was a ship, containing U.S. tanks approaching the port of Pireaus on the day of the coup. Ambassador Talbot and General Eaton (Head, U.S. Military mission) conferred and within a few minutes agreed that it must not arrive at such an

inopportune time. They recommended that the ship be diverted, and it was sent to Turkey instead. Similarly another ship was stopped in Italy and unloaded. The motivation for this action was to avoid having additional tanks arrive to join the U.S. tanks just used to destroy the constitutional government.⁹⁰ This "emergency" response would become a permanent act, that would breed a great amount of controversy later on with regard to its effect and meaning. The immediate reaction could be summarized as one of in-action, neither recognizing or repudiating the new regime. Essentially we did nothing. The rationale was that by continuing normal relations with 'the government', there would be more chance to influence them to return to constitutional government. Talbot recommended this course, in order to protect U.S. and NATO interests. He advised that the question of recognition not be even addressed. The justification for this was that the ambassador was accredited to the King, not to a particular regime, so there was no need to recognize it. At the same time, Talbot and the other embassy personnel would stress the importance of a quick return to constitutional government.

His final recommendation was that "we utilize the dialogue regarding long-term MAP (Military Assistance Program) planning as a means of pressuring the government, by installments, to formulate and announce their program of evolution toward a constitutional regime".⁹¹ All of Talbot's recommendations were implemented except the last. The Department of Defense personnel were greatly concerned about the geostrategic location of Greece and the bases we had there. Consequently no further use of the MAP "lever" was forthcoming, except for the

institutionalization of the "heavy weapons" ban (tanks, ships, aircraft, etc.) started by Talbot and Eaton.

Over the next seven months, the policy became two headed. The Embassy maintained the quiet neutrality, and the military showed outright support. They considered the Junta to be anti-communist, pro U.S., and pro NATO. This was all true. To show support, the Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces Europe (CINCEUR), General Burchinall, sent repeated cables to Washington to push for continued aid to Greece. Another senior commander in Europe called the Junta "the greatest government since Pericles." General Goodpaster, Commander of all NATO forces, visited Papadopoulos and was photographed with him smiling in apparent approval.⁹² Military leaders apparently were allowed to act without any control from the State Department and the Pentagon did not move to restrain them.

In the midst of this, the inflamed situation in the Middle East and the growing commitment in Southeast Asia drew the attention and headlines away from Greece, and a status quo developed. The military constantly pointed to Greece as a critical base for operations to support Israel and the State Department did nothing.

The next period would be ushered in by the unsuccessful counter coup by King Constantine. He had come to the United States in late August, with the unstated goal of "testing the waters" for American support to a move against the Junta. The reaction was continued ambivalence, for the most part, and an occasional lecture for "starting the whole thing" by

forcing Papandreou out of office in 1965. The King's plan included backing by a broad coalition of civilian politicians and an attempt to gain the support of the military stationed in the Northern portion of the country.

The plan was proceeding well when in November, another crisis on Cyprus erupted. To summarize the episode (and America's role in it), the 10,000 LOK commandos, that were infiltrated onto Cyprus under Papandreou, became the bone of contention after several Greek Cypriot attacks on the Turkish Cypriot communities. The Turks threatened to invade in retaliation. The Greeks, after ten days of round-the-clock shuttle diplomacy with Cyrus Vance, sent by President Johnson, removed the illegal troops, guerrilla leader George Grivas, and the Turks agreed not to invade. It was seen as a great defeat for the Junta. The entire episode caused the King to be emboldened and increased the perception that the U.S. could force its will on the Junta.

The King felt out Ambassador Talbot and CIA Chief Maury, but never gave them the specifics until the eve of the coup. He requested that a message be played over Voice of America radio and that the Sixth Fleet make an appearance in Phaleron Bay.⁹³ No such support ever materialized. The King's coup failed in a few hours and he and his family fled to Italy. Talbot would later be accused of disloyalty and collusion by both sides. The King never got the support he felt we were promising, and the Junta felt Talbot had aided the King. His influence with the Junta was now near zero, but he would continue to hold the job of Ambassador for another year. The Junta named a regent in place of the King. In January

1968, the State Department reiterated it's position that no recognition was needed. It still considered the King the ruler of Greece as long as the government did. The use of a regent implied this fact and the legality of the government was not called into question.

Essentially, the quiet persuasion policy persisted. The Arms Embargo was kept to only high visibility "heavy" items. Small arms, radios and other military gear continued to be supplied. There was also an exception to the embargo made in the fall of 1968. Following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia a "one time" delivery of minesweeping ships, tanks, and fighter aircraft was made, to bolster the Greek ability to fulfill it's NATO commitments at the time of increased Soviet activity.

There were repeated claims of repression and torture during this time period. The European Commission of Human Rights began an extensive investigation into the charges and would eventually call for Greece's expulsion from the Council of Europe. The Greeks withdrew the night before the meeting that would have dismissed them.⁹⁴ United States legislators picked up on these activities, and a small number of them managed to keep the issue alive despite an overwhelming interest in Viet Nam. These small beginnings would blossom later.

The third period, covering the first two years of the Nixon administration, showed little stated official change in the U.S. policy. Assistant Secretary of State for near Eastern and South Asian affairs,

Rodger Davies, doggedly stated before several Senate and House Committees that:

"Our policy is one of maintaining working relations with this government in order to keep up our ties with the Greek people while, at the same time, urging the regime to move toward the restoration of parliamentary government."⁹⁵

There were, however, several changes that would occur within this apparently continuous policy.

One was the actions of Vice President Spiro T. Agnew. While still a candidate in 1968, he stated that the military regime had "not proven itself to be as horrendous a specter to contemplate as most people thought it would".⁹⁶ He would be among the parade of politicians that would go to Greece in the next few years, joining the military leaders that had been going since 1967.

In September 1969 after several months of congressional pushing for various candidates, Henry J. Tasca was appointed as the new Ambassador to Greece. Upon his selection (before his confirmation) President Nixon informed him that the decision to resume full military aid to Greece had been made. The National Security Council (NSC) would formally approve it a few days later. Tasca's instructions were to improve relations with the Papadopoulos regime, as military considerations were paramount. This was consistent with Nixon's policy orientation (realist) and world views.⁹⁷

The increased number of visits to Greece by high level officials accelerated once Tasca assumed office. Vice President Agnew, Defense Secretary Laird and Commerce Secretary Stans were all visitors. Stans in particular raised a furor by stating that President Nixon sent his "warm love" to the Government of Greece. The Embassy quickly clarified he had really said "warmth and confidence". In this case the "unofficial" actions seemed to speak much louder than the official policies.⁹⁸

Throughout this period the administration continued to hold Congress and its other critics at bay by pointing to the conscious decision to employ leverage through military aid and quiet persuasion to accomplish our dual goals of continued relations with the Greek government while encouraging a return to constitutional normalcy. There was also an expansion of this policy rationalization by decoupling our military considerations (bases, rights, etc.) from the political consideration (NATO, EEC disapproval of the dictatorship). The State Department claimed that even opposition leaders in Greece agreed that the U.S. should continue to help Greece defend itself.⁹⁹

Congressman Rosenthal's sub-committee on Europe was a continuous forum for debate on our policy in Greece throughout this period. Later (1970) Senator Symington and his sub-committee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad would also take up the subject. These two groups were platforms for many critics of the Junta as well as the U.S. policy. However, the members of the committees seemed to be split on the issues, based on their questions during the hearings.

Overall, the policy remained officially the same throughout the period under study. This official policy of both the Johnson and Nixon Administration can be summarized as follows:

1. No recognition, because none was required.
2. No openly critical statements about the regime.
3. Retention of normal relations to maintain contact with the government.
4. Encourage through quiet persuasion a return to constitutional government
5. Protect U.S. and NATO strategic interests.
6. Do not cause any more friction than necessary.
7. Embargo "heavy arms" (except for fall of '68) until September 1970, continue other military aid.

During the Johnson administration, this truly was the policy. During Nixon's term, the unofficial policy was much more conciliatory with the greatly increased high level administration visits, and increased positive activities by our Ambassador, Mr. Tasca. Throughout the period the importance of #5 (above) was clearly displayed. Representatives of the Department of Defense were quick to point out to any questioner the key strategic role of Greece and the importance of protecting our interests there.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION

OPTIONS

In this section we shall attempt to identify all options that were open to U.S. policy makers during the situation. Those levers that were used and those that were not, will be enumerated. Additionally, the specific action in each area, corresponding to the different levels of response, will be grouped into packages. Placement of the actual administration policy within this framework will be the next discussion. It will take the form of a critique of the actual policy, speculation on the effect of the unused options and a final evaluation of the U.S. performance in this case.

The possible responses that might have been taken fall into four main categories. They are: diplomatic, material, military, and external. Admittedly, there is some overlap in that several specific actions could fit into more than one category. But for the most part these groupings will meet our needs.

In the diplomatic realm, there are three areas of possible action. These are recognition of the government, the number and individuals involved in high visibility visits, and the rhetoric (for or against) utilized by government officials. The issue of recognition gave us three possibilities, we could have recognized the new military regime, done nothing, or repudiated it and broken off diplomatic relations. This particular issue is a difficult one, because of the various legal arguments involved. According to international law, recognition is not a sign of approval or disapproval. It may be granted if a government is

truly in control of the nation in question.¹⁰⁰ The other legal complication is, who the ambassador is accredited to, within the government. In this case he was accredited to the King, not to a particular government serving the King. All of this had to be weighed in the process of choosing one of these three courses.

The next area, the number of high visibility visits and who makes them in addition to the normal business conducted by embassy personnel, can be a strong indicator of the relationship between two governments. There are a certain number of high visibility visits that will occur between allied nations as a matter of course. They are normally scheduled in advance, and are fairly predictable. The policy makers therefore could have taken four possible tracks. They could have increased these visits, (both quantitatively and qualitatively). They could have continued with the "normal" scheduled visits, decreased them or eliminated them completely.

Lastly, in the diplomatic realm is rhetoric in the form of official statements. Again, there were four tracks which could have been used. The administration spokesmen could have praised the Junta, to show outright support. They simply could have made no statement that undermined them, thereby giving quiet support by omission. Indicate regret over the need to resort to extra constitutional means, encourage a return to constitutional government which would register quiet disapproval. And lastly, they could have condemned the Junta as a repugnant dictatorship and demanded a return to the constitutionally sanctioned government.

In the area of material contacts there were two possible areas of action. The obvious and most overt one concerns the Military Aid Program (MAP). This lever, was a crucial one, because of the dependence of Greece on the U.S. for its military aid. As with the other areas, the options were, to increase aid, let it remain the same, decrease it or eliminate it completely.

The related area of economic contacts and investments was the other substantive open avenue. Expansion of such contacts could be encouraged or the status quo maintained. They could have been discouraged and civilian corporations quietly pressured to decrease contacts, or there could have been full scale economic sanctions imposed to force the Junta out of power.

The next major category is military actions. It has two components. The first, politico-military agreements, concerns leases, military exchanges for training, joint operations, and strategic facilities and rights. As to other options, we could expand this area with new agreements, thereby granting approval, leave them the same, cut back slightly or pull out U.S. forces completely. More overtly, there is always the option of military force. For the most part, this is not a viable option, despite what some uninformed individuals might think. However, the threat of it can have a public relations effect. The policy makers could have done nothing, taken a symbolic action such as sending the Sixth Fleet into Pireaus Harbor or have sent troops in to overthrow the Junta. The last option is always available, but because it is, politically speaking, totally unrealistic, it probably was not even

considered an option. The fleet, however, could have been viewed as support or disapproval depending on the rhetoric that went with it.

The other area not yet mentioned is action through international organizations. The United States and Greece belong to numerous groups through which action could have been initiated. These include, primarily, the United Nation's and NATO. Additionally, we could have indirectly influenced Greece, through our other allies, who shared membership with Greece in the Council of Europe and the EEC.

These various actions can be grouped into four "packages." Each "package" represents a different level of reaction to the Greek regime. Realizing the danger in oversimplification, these can be labeled as outright support, quiet support, quiet disapproval and outright disapproval. To avoid redundancy with the presentation of the specific actions, a synopsis of the packages is displayed at Figure 1, illustrating to what degree each action is included in each package. These packages are not designed to be "sacred cows" that must be adopted in total, but it will be instructive to see them in logical groupings. This would avoid use of conflicting activities, that would, in a sense, be pulling in different directions. It is critical that a policy be tailored to a situation, and also be consistent if it is to be effective. The actual policy pursued by the two administrations, reveals some interesting aspects, when it is placed within this four package scheme. The analysis will illustrate the lack of consistency in that policy.

T Y P E	ACTION	POLICY PACKAGE for SELECTED POSITIONS			
		OUTRIGHT APPROVAL	QUIET APPROVAL	QUIET DISAPPROVAL	OUTRIGHT DISAPPROVAL
D I P L O M A T I C	OFFICIAL RECOG- NITION	RECOGNIZE	IN-ACTION	IN-ACTION RECALL AMBASSADOR/FOR CONSULTATION	REPUDIATE/ BREAK-OFF RELATIONS
	HIGH VISIBIL- ITY VISITS	INCREASE	STATUS QUO	DECREASE	ELIMINATE
	RHETORIC	PRAISE	AVOID NEGATIVE STATEMENTS	ENCOURAGE RETURN TO DEMOCRACY	CONDEMN/ DEMAND RETURN TO DEMOCRACY
M A T E R I A L	M.A.P.	INCREASE	STATUS QUO	DECREASE/ LIMITED SANCTIONS	ELIMINATE
	ECONOMIC CONTACTS AND INVEST.	EXPAND AND ENCOURAGE	STATUS QUO	DECREASE AND DISCOURAGE	ECONOMIC SANDCTIONS
M I L I T A R Y	POLITICO MILITARY AGREE- MENTS	SEEK NEW AGREEMENTS	STATUS QUO	CLOSE NON-ESSENTIAL FACILITIES	COMPLETE PULLOUT
	MILITARY FORCE	SHOW THE FLEET WITH POSITIVE RHETORIC	NOTHING	NOTHING	SHOW THE FLEET WITH NEGATIVE RHETORIC
E X T E R N A L	INT'L ORGAN- IZATION	VETO ANY SANCTIONS	STATUS QUO	NOT HINDER NEGATIVE ACTIONS	CALL FOR SANCTIONS OR EXPULSION
	ALLIES	PRESSURE FOR POSITIVE AND AGAINST NEG- ATIVE ACTION	DISCOURAGE NEGATIVE ACTION	NON INVOLEMENT	ENCOURAGE NEGATIVE ACTION

Figure 1

CRITIQUE

Throughout the entire period under study, U.S. policy was vague and ambiguous. It fell into the trap that can easily occur, when an area is a "side show", as Greece was viewed, when compared to the Middle East and Viet Nam. Our actions showed little foresight and analysis, and may have been very detrimental to U.S. interests in the long term. Any policy must be judged by it's ability to achieve it's goals, and in a more general sense, how well it meets the criteria described in the first section of this study. Does it indeed fall within the acceptable limits circumscribed by the overlapping area of morally correct and interest satisfying actions. The U.S. policy had the stated goals of protecting U.S. and NATO strategic interests and encouraging the Junta to restore constitutional government through quiet persuasion. These goals, espoused, by both administrations that were involved, seem to meet those criteria.

When pressed, government spokesmen such as Assistant Secretary Davies spoke of "our disapproval of the extra constitutional nature of the regime."¹⁰¹ However, as can be seen by entering the actual policy on Figure 1, (seen on the next/preceeding page) the actions taken did not express this disapproval very well. With respect to recognition, they chose to do nothing, using legal camouflage to avoid an issue, when it should have been confronted, given our leadership role in the world. At the very least, our Ambassador should have been recalled for consultations, the least injurious action in this realm that would still show disapproval. This latter action would have displayed our surprise

and distress over the coup, and still allowed us to continue relations upon the ambassador's return. Some apologists, for the administration, point to the delay between Talbot leaving and Tasca arriving as a sign of disapproval. In fact, the delay was caused by political maneuvering for congressionally supported candidates for the job. It took several months to finally choose Tasca.

The next area, high visibility visits, was particularly contradictory. From the beginning, the administration claimed disapproval, but high level military leaders went through Athens at a surprising rate. During the period in question, some fifty general and flag officers made nearly 100 visits to the Junta Colonels.¹⁰² The trend grew stronger during the Nixon administration, as high level civilian leaders joined their military counterparts. This gave the Junta a public relations lift of untold magnitude.

The official rhetoric was mild, often conciliatory and at times defensive where the coup makers were concerned. Disapproval was voiced, but the same spokesmen would defend U.S. policy by pointing to the progress being made, when little was in evidence. Again, from the candidacy of Agnew, and beyond, the rhetoric began to change from mild disapproval to words that could be easily interpreted as support. Ambassador Tasca continued to maintain that he was pushing the colonels toward a return to democracy, but his overtly positive overtures could hardly be called pressure. His subordinates at the embassy would later accuse him of doctoring figures, such as crowd sizes, to illustrate the support and progress of the Junta.¹⁰³ While his loyalty and obedience

to his orders from Nixon are admirable on one hand, Tasca's actions did little to promote a return to democracy.

The use of the MAP as a lever to influence the Greeks was never planned in a systematic way. Talbot and Easton made the correct decision to divert the two approaching ships during the coup, but to make this "ban" the center piece of our policy, simply never worked. The government argument for using quiet diplomacy was that Greece was strategically vital to NATO. But the selective suspension deprived the Greeks of the means of accomplishing it's NATO missions. Conversely, we never interrupted small arms, radio, and other multipurpose equipment that could be used in an internal security role against opposition groups. In fact, the overall amount of aid to Greece under the MAP was greater for the three years after the coup (FY '68-'70) than the three years before (FY '65-'67). The figures show that in the pre-coup period, the Greeks received an average of \$95.2 million each year, and \$106.9 million after the coup. This was due to a sharp increase in the delivery of excess defense articles and Foreign Military Sales.¹⁰⁴ In short, the selective suspension was ineffective in encouraging a return to democracy and actually hurt U.S. and NATO security. The latter was the justification for the ending of the suspension in September 1970.

The economic status quo was maintained for the most part. Once there was no major interruption of U.S. business activities in Greece, everyone was assured that there would be a reasonably stable environment. The Johnson administration did not involve itself in any appreciable way. There were, however, several rather questionable activities during the

Nixon period. There were many allegations of influence between the Junta, the Nixon people and several Greek-American businessmen. The activities of Litton Industries, and the Pappas brothers are two examples. Commerce Secretary Stans lauded the Greeks for the healthy investment environment they had developed. In any case, the dubious dealings did awaken the suspicions of collusion by businessmen in the U.S. policy.¹⁰⁵

The strategic importance of U.S. and NATO facilities on Greek soil is the key point to the entire issue. In the eyes of the Department of Defense, and most of the Department of State as well, the protection of these facilities was paramount. Both administrations continually pointed to this issue as the overriding concern and the rudder of their policy. These facilities were crucial, and to have been cut off from them would surely have damaged NATO and U.S. security. A point overlooked however, is that the Greeks, particularly the Junta needed those facilities (manned by U.S. forces) as much as we did. Not necessarily from a security stand point alone, but due to U.S. aid and spending that was tied to them. The Greek military would have never allowed the Junta to turn from NATO in any kind of a substantial manner. There was never any consideration of closing any facility, although even then some of the activities could have been conducted by satellite without loss of effectiveness. All of these bases were clearly not vital to our strategic interests (some were), and the inappropriate "lumping together" of all facilities eliminated a great deal of flexibility in our position. The use of military force was never considered; Greece was an ally, and

even the use of the Sixth Fleet as a symbolic threat or prop would have been inappropriate.

The only visible action of the U.S., in the area of international organizations or with regard to our allies, came in the area of justifying conflicting policies. Other NATO nations (West Germany) cut aid to Greece, but all the Western European nations continued to sell arms and other goods commercially.¹⁰⁶ The Europeans were considerably more vocal in their criticism, particularly the Council of Europe and EEC. We explained our policy in the NATO council and no one brought up the issue of expulsion publicly except U.S. Congressmen.¹⁰⁷ We did attempt to persuade the Council of Europe not to expel the Greeks. This was a futile and ill-advised gesture.

Moving from the very specific to a more general analysis, we must look at several questions. First, was the policy consistent with its goals and that elusive definition of acceptable action? Next, did it help achieve those goals? Did the policy protect both the long term and short interests of the U.S.?

The 'policy' for the most part was within the acceptable area. It was, however, not totally consistent with the goals espoused by the U.S. government, nor did it achieve all the goals. The only actions that could have construed as displaying disapproval were the mild State Department statements. None of the actions taken truly implemented this disapproval. The selective suspension was circumvented through other means. Little was done that caused a move toward democratic government.

The only real achievements were the release of some political prisoners, the writing of a constitution (never fully implemented) and the reopening of several newspapers (with severe censorship laws).

There was never any reason for the Junta to respond to the "urgings" to liberalize their regime. Talbot lost his effectiveness after the counter coup, and Tasca's orders were to normalize relations. The task of quiet persuasion was left to one man who couldn't do it. and then to another who had been given other priorities. Given the "empty quiver" that they had to work with, I don't see how anyone could have accomplished this task. Congressman Paul Findley asked "...what leverage remains? You speak of quiet persuasion, but if it isn't backed up with something of substance, what effect can it have?"¹⁰⁸

The other goal of protecting U.S. and NATO interests was accomplished. We still had rights to all facilities, bases, and right of ways, and they were still denied to the Soviets. The key issue here, however, was the threat to those interests. There was never any real threat from the Communists in 1967. Even the most liberal civilian government that could have come to power would not have hurt our interests in Greece. They all saw those interests as essentially synonymous with their own. While there were differences between liberal elements in Greek politics and Defense Department plans, the overall substance of U.S. deployments would not have markedly changed.

In the long term, there was some damage. We did become associated with a repugnant regime. The degree of influence that we actually had is

very much open to debate. But it is clear that we did not exercise all of the influence that we had available to us. In failing to do so, a lingering suspicion as to "evil" U.S. intentions still persists to this day. The present government in Greece has campaigned twice on a platform that had a major plank calling for the removal of U.S. facilities from Greece and pulling out of NATO. Andreas Papandreu has not followed through on his campaign promises, but clearly the scars of the period are still there.

In final evaluation of our policy, it did not fail, but it was very weak. We had an opportunity to gain credibility, prestige and influence, without hurting ourselves strategically, and the opportunity was missed. During the Johnson administration, this was clearly due to a preoccupation with Viet Nam first, and with Israel's protection.

Johnson was content to accept Talbot's policy of "reaction to the moment", a ban on heavy arms and quiet diplomacy, a painless and effortless way to go. Time would show that they had taken the easier wrong instead of the harder right. The policy may have been valid if it had been implemented with a more effective use of MAP by an Ambassador who still had influence with the Junta. But, as Talbot floundered, reports of repression and torture grew, and no appreciable move toward democracy appeared. The policy quickly became bankrupt. It would remain so until the end of the Johnson administration.

When President Nixon assumed office, he and Dr. Kissinger saw this as a chance to gain increased strategic advantage and particularly saw it

as an aid to the Middle East situation. Kissinger's realist outlook, normally very astute, failed to see past the issue of the military aspects. Standing behind the Talbot/Johnson policy, the Nixon people proceeded to ignore the half concerning encouraging a return to democracy. This was wrong (morally and politically), and was a perfect example of stepping out of the acceptable range of actions. We received no additional or necessary increases in the area of security interests, but we were acting in an improper manner. To do this without justification of the highest degree, is not only immoral, but poor stewardship of our nation.

If one holds that strategic interests were paramount in this case, how could the decision makers better accomplish their stated goals? The key, in a sensitive situation such as this, is perceptions as well as substance. This includes domestic and international perceptions as well as the perceptions of the object of our policy (Greece). Assistant Secretary Davies insisted that, "We have made our position on the political side crystal clear."¹⁰⁹ This was simply not the case. Few, if anyone, could clearly read the intention behind the U.S. policy. Had the Johnson administration been a bit more cognizant of what was going on in Greece, the entire policy may have been different.

With the benefit of hindsight, I would like to offer a policy package that I believe would have accomplished the protection of our interest, provided strong encouragement for a return to democracy and would have proved to be politically more palatable in the long term.

Initially, Talbot's redirecting of the two ships was correct. He should have been recalled for consultations with recognition withheld until his return. At that time recognition should have been made in the same manner that the British utilized. That is recognition combined with a strongly worded statement announcing the disapproval of the extra constitutional measures being used by the Junta. While this was occurring the kind of face to face, off the record, talk that Papdopoulos offered to CIA Chief Maury should have been utilized to inform the Junta of the basis of our disapproval and of our concern for the strategic interests.

The Military Assistance Program would be curtailed, and then incremental restoration worked out keyed to measures aimed at a return to a constitutionally run government. A clear statement, from the highest level, should have been made stating materials and weapons systems essential to Greece's NATO mission would not be included in the curtailment. The justification for this would quite simply be strategic interests, with no subterfuge.

All unnecessary visits, particularly by high ranking individuals would be cancelled. Additionally, no military leader would make statements concerning the nature of the regime without clearance on such a statement.

Finally, no new politico-military agreements would be concluded. If possible, any unnecessary facility or excess personnel would be

recalled. The return of such facilities or personnel would be included on the keyed schedule for resumption of MAP.

In short all visible signs of disapproval, that would leave the lines of communications open and still maintain our interests in the short term, would be used. This would have increased our prestige with the Greek people, our allies, and the world, without endangering our strategic interests or abandoning the Greeks. This would also therefore protect our long term interest.

As seen by this Study the overall assessment and evaluation of our policy in this case was a poor one. It accomplished the minimum necessary to avoid being labeled a failed policy, and did protect our strategic interests, but it did not encourage a return to democracy or provide for good future relations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States will continue to face dilemmas such as it faced concerning Greece from April 1967-September 1970. It has recently faced them in Iran and Nicaragua, and today faces one again in South Africa. It may be useful to look at common aspects that may reoccur in such cases, to see where we must place emphasis in the future. To amplify the utility of the study let's broaden the scope to include any regime that has the following general description. It would be pro-American and anti-Soviet. It would probably be a military regime, but actually could

be any authoritarian government. Harsh or repressive internal control is probably the rule. There is some sort of vocal resistance to the government, either in exile or within the country itself. Lastly, there is a significant body of adverse world opinion against the regime. The broadening away from only those regimes that have recently seized power by force merely allows for wider application.

Obviously, by including regimes that may have been in place for a period of time, the policy makers would need to determine the proper time to begin any new policy, so as not to disturb the larger policy plans of the administration. Times such as changes in administrations (ours or theirs) or the beginning or conclusion of armed conflict are all appropriate times for policy shifts, if they are deemed necessary.

Once a regime has been included in this grouping, critical analysis must take place before any policy can be formulated and/or instituted. First, it must be determined if they are truly pro-American or not. Would they fight with the United States, or are they merely "customers?" To what degree do they see their interests co-terminous with ours? If some kind of mutual bond is not present, they will prove to be poor risks.

Next, the degree of repression must be determined. Reports can be exaggerated and many times are. The repression may be necessary for the maintenance of order at the present time. Are the internal security measures long term or just for a particular period. One man's repression

may be another's status quo. This is best illustrated by our own Revolutionary War.

Is the vocal resistance truly representative of the majority of the people? If it is not, actions must be taken to determine what the mass of the people really want. Great care must be taken in this area. America has been led astray here before. What effect will U.S. action (of any kind) have on the internal situation. The most obvious example of this is an economic boycott. It can hurt the government, but it could starve the people first.

A realistic evaluation of the influence that we have must be made. From time to time the United States is perceived as having a great deal of ability it doesn't really have. Can action on our part make a difference? If so, will it be a significant one, that accomplishes our goals?

The last two considerations concern strategic interests. They are therefore by nature key points of analysis upon which the entire issue may turn. The first is, will the authoritarian government turn elsewhere if the U.S. pressures them to change. In the Greek case, despite improved relations with its Balkan neighbors, there was absolutely no possibility the Greek people or the military would have allowed the Junta to turn to the Soviets for assistance. If there is a possibility of such a turn, extreme caution must be exercised before taking action. Along the same lines, before we pressure any government to change or step down, we need to know precisely the nature and intent of whoever will replace

them. In Greece, we were fairly certain that any government that would replace the Junta would be liberal, but would still remain pro-western. In Nicaragua, the Carter administration miscalculated the Sandinistas and the result was a more repressive, expansionist communist regime.

These last two aspects must be resolved before any action can be taken of a substantive nature. Rhetoric and posturing for political facesaving is fine, but before any real action is taken our leaders must have assessed the potential results to the fullest degree. No one in this country with any moral values would argue that apartheid is morally repugnant, and that the rule by the white minority is unfair and wrong. For our leaders to say that is fine, eliminating non-essential visits to show our disapproval and to forbid government and military officials to speak positively about the Botha government is all permissible.

But, unless the leaders of this nation are ready to accept the consequences of a hostile government on the Cape of Africa, possibly a pro-Soviet one, or worst yet, total anarchy among the inhabitants, more substantial moves should not be undertaken lightly. It may be a morally improper government and system in the short term, but the larger scenario must also be assessed. Millions of people depend on the oil that goes over the sea route round the Cape. What is the morality of potentially holding the world's supertankers ransom. Can the U.S. pursue a policy that might endanger American lives in the event of a major confrontation with the Soviets in the name of action for another people? Lastly, where will morality be if there is total anarchy in what is now South Africa, it could lead to untold bloodshed and destruction among the inhabitants

of all races. These issues must be confronted before a policy is chosen.

The policy packages previously presented in Figure 1 can be used as a guide for a consistent response, once the degree of response is decided upon. However, caution is advised again. The United States, as a nation, has always attempted to be guided by moral principles, but, we are a nation involved in a world composed of men, groups, and actors, all of whom are not necessarily moral. We therefore should return to the advice of our forefathers; let our national interest be the focal point of our international policy undergirded by moral principles. A quotation from the Bible, may be appropriate here ... "be wary and wise as serpents, and be innocent, guileless, and without falsity as doves".¹¹⁰ Our policy makers should take note of that instruction and would do well to heed it.

END NOTES

END NOTES

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
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